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T
he U.S. economy turned in an exceptional
performance in 1999, combining strong
real output growth with moderate infla-
tion. Real GDP, a broad measure of the nations
output of goods and services, grew 4.6 percent
from the fourth quarter of 1998 to the fourth
quarter of 1999. Employment also rose solidly,
and the civilian unemployment rate declined to
the lowest level in about 30 years. Although ris-
ing world oil prices caused consumer prices to
increase faster than in 1998, core inflation mea-
sures, which exclude food and energy prices,
were about the same or slightly lower. More-
over, survey measures of long-term inflation
expectations were stable despite the robust pace
of the economic expansion.
What accounts for this exceptional combina-
tion of rapid growth and moderate inflation?
Several factors helped hold down the inflation
rate, including strong import competition and
ample industrial capacity at home and abroad.
But many recent discussions have emphasized
the pronounced increase in productivity growth,
reflecting both the high level of business invest-
ment and accelerated technological change. In
particular, new information technologies, such
as computers and the Internet, may be increasing
economic efficiency through better coordina-
tion of business activities and reduced invento-
ries. The evidence is unclear, however, about
how much of the productivity acceleration is
due to new technologies, and whether faster
productivity growth can be sustained in the
years ahead.
Suchquestionsarecrucialinjudgingwhether
rapid growth can continue without undermin-
ing the Federal Reserves long-run objectives
of price stability and sustainable economic
growth. This article examines recent inflation
developments and the policy implications of
faster productivity growth. The first section
reviews last years price statistics and discusses
various factors that affected overall and core
inflation.Thesecondsectionconsiderswhether
the recent faster pace of productivity growth
can be expected to persist in the years ahead.
Finally, the third section considers the inflation
outlook for 2000 and beyond, concluding that
monetary policymakers must remain vigilant
even if faster productivity growth continues.
I. INFLATION IN 1999
Early in 1999, some commentators expressed
concern that the economy was heading toward
deflation,apersistentdeclineinthegeneralprice
level. In the following months, however, crude
oil prices rose sharply and other commodity
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world growth. Depreciation of the dollar in the
second half of the year helped halt the decline in
nonoil import prices. In addition, the domestic
economy expanded rapidly last year, and labor
markets tightened. As a result, deflation faded as
a topic of concern, replaced by worries about
possiblefutureincreasesintheinflationrate.The
actual inflation statistics, though, were mixed.
Measures of inflation that directly reflect energy
prices, such as the CPI and the PPI, rose at a
somewhat faster rate last year, but core inflation
measureswereaboutthesameorslightlylower.
Inflation statistics and forecasts
Measures of consumer price inflation that
include food and energy prices increased some-
what in 1999. The inflation rate of the all-items
CPIroseto2.6percentlastyearfrom1.5percent
in 1998 (Chart 1). The CPI inflation rate was
slightly above most forecasts made in late 1998
or early 1999 (Table 1). An alternative measure
of consumer prices from the national income
and product accounts also rose at a faster rate
last year. The chain-weighted personal consump-
tion expenditure index (PCE price index) rose




did not accelerate markedly last year. Core CPI
inflation actually decreased to 2.1 percent from
2.4 percent in 1998. However, core PCE infla-
tion increased slightly to 1.5 percent from 1.3
percentin1998.Itisdoubtfulwhethera0.1per-
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Chart 1
CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION
Note: Data are Q4/Q4 percent changes.































price indexcentage point increase in core PCE inflation is
meaningful, but even if that change is viewed as
meaningful, the acceleration was much smaller
than that of the overall PCE price index.
Otherbroadmeasuresoftheinflationratewere
mixed in 1999 (Chart 2). The chain-weighted
index for gross domestic product (GDP price
index) is the broadest inflation rate considered
here, measuring the average price change for all
final goods and services produced in the United
States. The GDP price index increased 1.6 per-
centlastyear,upfroma1.0percentgainin1998.
This increase was near, but slightly below, what
many forecasters predicted in late 1998 or early
1999(Table1).ThePPIforfinishedgoodsaccel-
erated sharply in 1999, rising 3.0 percent after a
decline of 0.5 percent the year before. But the
sharp increase in oil prices appears to explain
this large change in producer price inflation.
Excluding food and energy prices, the core PPI
rose by a modest 1.5 percent, down from 1.6
percent in 1998.
Effects of energy and food prices
Large movements in petroleum prices clearly
hadanimportanteffectoninflationoverthelast
two years. Oil prices decreased substantially in
1998,loweringtheinflationratefortheCPIand
other broad indexes that include energy prices.
The decline in oil prices was partly due to a
drop in world oil demand, caused by the finan-
cial crises in many developing economies. The
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Table 1
YEAR-AHEAD INFLATION FORECASTS FOR 1999
Percent
Forecast Date published CPI GDP price index
FOMC* February 1999 2.0-2.5 NA
CEA February 1999 2.3 1.9
CBO January 1999 2.5 1.7
Survey of Professional Forecasters 4th Quarter 1998 2.3 1.6
Blue Chip consensus January 1999 2.1 1.7
Livingston Survey December 1998 2.2 NA
University of Michigan
Consumer Survey January 1999 2.7 NA
Addenda:
Actual inflation in 1999 2.6 1.6
* Central tendency of projections made by Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank Presidents.
Note: Data are Q4/Q4 percent changes, except for the Livingston Survey and Michigan survey figures, which are Decem-
ber/December percent changes. Figures from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and from the University of Michigan
ConsumerSurveyarethemediansofindividualforecastsandexpectations,respectively.DatafromtheBlueChipConsen-
sus and Livingston Survey are the averages of individual forecasts. GDP price index forecasts are not available for the
FOMC, Livingston Survey, and Michigan survey. The Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Livingston Survey are
compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.spot price of West Texas crude oil declined to
$11.28 per barrel in December 1998 (Chart 3).
However, efforts by oil-producing countries to
reduce their output raised petroleum prices sub-
stantially in 1999. In addition, world oil demand
began to recover as economic growth strength-
ened in Europe and as many developing econo-
mies recovered faster than expected from their
financial crises. Oil prices more than doubled in
1999, closing the year around $26 per barrel.
Reflecting these large fluctuations in crude oil
prices, the energy components of the major price
indexes accelerated sharply between 1998 and
1999. For example, energy prices in the CPI rose
11.2 percent in 1999 after falling 9.2 percent in
1998. Similarly, energy prices in the finished-
goods PPI jumped 15.1 percent after dropping
11.1 percent in 1998.
But any effects of the oil price fluctuations on
core inflation were harder to discern. His-
torically, changes in oil prices have had less of
an effect on core inflation because energy
prices affect other prices with a lag, and
because large increases or decreases in energy
pricesaresometimesreversedratherquickly.In
addition, the economy is less dependent on oil
than in the 1970s (Kendell; Liesman and
Schlesinger). However, oil is still an important
rawmaterialinmanyproductionprocesses,and
the price of oil affects transportation costs for
many industries. Thus, if oil prices remain at
recent high levels, last years sharp gain in
energy prices might have a more noticeable
effect on core inflation in 2000.
2
In contrast to the energy sector, food prices
rose modestly in 1999. Reduced foreign demand
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Chart 2
OTHER MEASURES OF INFLATION
Note: Data are Q4/Q4 percent changes.



















GDP price index PPI finished goods Core PPI finished goods
1.5 1.5
2.0 2.0
2.5 2.5for U.S. agricultural products and abundant
domesticsuppliesputdownwardpressureoncrop
prices. However, the prices of finished food
products also reflect manufacturing, transporta-
tion, and marketing costs, which generally rose
last year. The net effect was that the food price
component of the CPI increased 1.9 percent in
1999, down slightly from a 2.3 percent gain in
1998.
Other factors affecting inflation
Various other factors affected the inflation rate
in 1999. For example, several of the special
factors that lowered inflation in 1998 either sta-
bilized or reversed somewhat in 1999, putting
upward pressure on the inflation rate. Although
the large increase in crude oil prices was the
most dramatic example of a reversal, other pri-
mary commodity prices also strengthened in
1999 as foreign economic growth stabilized
and then started to recover. In addition, the for-
eign exchange value of the dollar weakened
somewhat in the second half of the year, and
foreign excess capacity began to diminish. As a
result, nonoil import prices, which decreased
during much of 1998 and early 1999, began to
rise in the second half of last year.
Surging tobacco prices were also a factor in
consumer price inflation last year. Tobacco
companies boosted their prices sharply at the
end of 1998 and in 1999 to cover the costs of
legal settlements against those companies. The
sharp rise in tobacco prices was clearly caused
by supply factors that were unrelated to aggre-
gate demand or the stance of monetary policy.
However, as in the case of higher oil prices, an
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Chart 3
CRUDE OIL PRICES  WEST TEXAS SPOT





















26 26increase in the price of one commodity relative
to others may temporarily raise the measured
inflation rate.
3
Afactor that may have contributed to low core
inflationlastyearwasadecelerationinunitlabor
costs (ULC). Unit labor costs in the nonfarm
businesssectorgrewbyonly0.7percentin1999,
more than a percentage point slower than in the
previous year (Chart 4). The restrained behavior
of unit labor costs reflects two main factors.
First, the growth rate of compensation per hour
inthenonfarmbusinesssectorslowedto4.3per-
cent from 5.3 percent in 1998. In addition, pro-
ductivity continued to grow rapidly, with
nonfarm business productivity up 3.3 percent
lastyear.Withlaborbeingthelargestcomponent
of business costs, the slowing in ULC may have
helped businesses limit their price increases.
Other major measures of labor compensation
confirmed that compensation growth did not
accelerate markedly last year despite the tight
labor market. Growth of the employment cost
index (ECI) increased slightly to 3.4 percent
from 3.3 percent in 1998, reflecting faster
growth of employee benefit costs partially off-
set by slower growth of wages and salaries
(Chart 4). Average hourly earnings of private
nonagricultural employees rose 3.6 percent last
year, down from a 3.8 percent gain in 1998.
4
Other factors may also have helped to coun-
teracttheupwardpressuresontheinflationrate.
Many business executives and economic com-
mentators pointed to a lack of pricing power in
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Chart 4
LABOR COST GROWTH
Note: Data are Q4/Q4 percent changes.



























hourly earningsU.S. product markets as an important factor
restraining core measures of inflation. Despite
the modest rise in nonoil import prices, import
competition remained intense, and the trade bal-
ance worsened substantially over the course of
last year. Domestic manufacturing capacity was
ample, with the average utilization rate for 1999
below the average for the last 30 years. In addi-
tion, some commentators cited the role of the
Internet, which may allow consumers to shop
moreeffectivelyforthebestbargains.Reflecting
such factors, some producers may have been
reluctant to raise prices for fear of losing their
customers to other companies.
Finally, methodological changes by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) lowered reported CPI
inflation last year (Haver). At the beginning of
1999, the BLS started using a geometric mean
formula to calculate price indexes for about 61
percent of total consumer spending in the CPI.
This methodological change was expected to
reduce reported CPI inflation by about 0.2 per-
centage point annually. Other methodological
changes by the BLS had small but indeterminate
effects on reported CPI inflation.
II. HAS TREND PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH INCREASED?
Underlying a number of the factors discussed
in the previous section is the recent increase
in productivity growth. As higher productivity
growth has continued over the last few years,
more observers have concluded that trend pro-
ductivity growththe average growth rate of
productivity abstracting from cyclical influ-
enceshas shifted upward. Some proponents of
this view have even written about a new econ-
omy in which the laws of supply and demand,
although not repealed, have been significantly
amended (Mandel; McTeer). This section exam-
ines whether the recent surge in productivity
represents a fundamental improvement in the
trenda development that would have impor-
tant implications for monetary policy.
Recent productivity gains
Recent statistics on labor productivity show
a substantial increase in productivity growth
over the last three years (Chart 5). Labor pro-
ductivity is the average output of goods and
services per hour worked. The average growth
rate of nonfarm business productivity for
1996-99 was 2.9 percent, well above the aver-
age growth rate of 1.5 percent over 1974-95.
Moreover, recent productivity growth slightly
exceeded the average productivity growth rate
of 2.8 percent annually for 1960-73, another
period of rapid economic growth.
5
Several factors may have contributed to the
higher productivity growth in 1996-99. Changes
in labor productivity reflect anything that alters
real output except a change in the number of
hours worked. For example, an increase in the
amountofcapitalgoods,suchascomputersand
machinery, used by workers should increase
labor productivity. Improvements in the quality
of labor inputs, such as a more educated work
force, could also raise measured labor pro-
ductivitybecauseaneducatedworkermaypro-
duce goods or services with higher value in a
given period of time. In addition, technological
advances might raise average output per hour
worked by improving the efficiency of the pro-
duction process so that a given amount of labor
andcapitalcanproducegreateroutput.Because
several aspects of the production process are
involved, labor productivity is not a pure
measure of how recent technological advances,
such as computerization and the Internet, are
changing the economy.
6
Faster productivity growth is desirable
because, over the long run, productivity growth
raises the living standards of American house-
holds. Higher productivity allows firms to pay
increased real wages to their workers without
lowering business profits. Or viewed differ-
ently, increased productivity allows the same
numberofworkerstoproducealargertotalout-
ECONOMIC REVIEW l FIRST QUARTER 2000 11put of goods and services, which can be con-
sumed directly by U.S. households or traded for
goods and services produced abroad. Moreover,
as the baby-boom generation retires in the years
ahead, higher productivity could help the Social
Security System support the larger number of
retirees without undue pressure on the living
standards of working-age families.
From a monetary policy standpoint, faster pro-
ductivity growth raises the potential growth rate
oftheeconomy,therateatwhichoutputofgoods
and services can grow without putting upward
pressure on inflation. Economists view output
and inflation as being determined by the interac-
tion of overall supply and demand for goods and
services. A faster rate of productivity growth
implies the supply of goods and services would
expand at a higher average rate. As a result, the
overall demand for goods and services could
alsogrowfasteroverthelongrunwithoutcreat-
ing shortages that would cause rising inflation.
Because monetary policy affects the demand
for goods and services, productivity growth
requires careful monitoring by policymakers.
Trend versus cyclical explanations
For monetary policymakers, a key issue is
whethertherecentsurgeinproductivitygrowth
is due primarily to higher trend productivity
growth or unsustainable cyclical factors. To the
extent that trend factors provide the explanation,
there is a stronger case that policymakers should
assume higher potential output growth in the
future and should permit faster long-run aver-
age growth in demand than would otherwise be
acceptable. However, the trend and cyclical
12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 5
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Note: Data are averages of Q4/Q4 percent changes.




















.5 .5explanations are not mutually exclusive, and
sorting out their relative importance is difficult.
Many economists are hesitant to conclude that
the stronger productivity growth of the last three
yearsrepresentsanincreaseintrendproductivity
growth. The recent surge in productivity might
belargelyabusinesscyclephenomenon.Growth
of nonfarm business productivity has a moder-
ately strong positive association with growth of
nonfarm business output (Chart 6).
7 As business
output turns down in a recession, firms may be
slow to lay off their workers, particularly skilled
workers, who might be hard to replace when the
economyturnsupagaininthefuture.Asaresult,
output tends to fall faster than hours worked,
producing a decline in measured labor produc-
tivity. During the following economic recovery,
firms can initially raise their output by working
their existing employees and equipment more
intensively, causing a sharp increase in mea-
sured productivity.
But the unusual timing of the recent surge in
productivity growth adds some credibility to
the view that trend productivity growth has
risen. Sharp increases in productivity growth
have been common when the economy was
recovering from a recession. The rapid pro-
ductivity growth shortly after the recessions
in 1981-82 and 1990-91 was fairly typical.
Althoughtherecentsurgeinproductivitygrowth
looksalotlikethesetwopreviousepisodes,itis
atypical in that the faster productivity growth is
occurring in the mature stages of the longest
expansion in U.S. economic history.
Besides this unusual timing, dramatic and
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Chart 6
PRODUCTIVITY AND OUTPUT GROWTH
Note: Data are percent changes from four quarters earlier.
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Productivity
Outputhighly visible improvements in computer and
communications technology make it more plau-
sible that a fundamental shift in trend productiv-
ity has occurred. Computer processing speeds
have grown at a rapid pace, causing the effective
price of computer power to decline relative to
other goods and services. In addition, important
advances have occurred in exchanging informa-
tion. The best known of these advances is the
Internet and related web technology, but cellular
telephones and other advances in wireless com-
munications are other highly visible examples.
Many observers believe recent advances in
information technology are producing funda-
mental changes in how businesses operate. The
new technology may permit more flexible pro-
duction processes, allowing firms to produce
with shorter lead times and reduced bottlenecks.
Such technology may allow better planning and
scheduling by firms, reducing inventory-sales
ratios as well as the need for redundant stocks of
workers and capital (Greenspan 2000a). New
information technologies also may have facili-
tated the rapid growth in international trade,
which has put competitive pressures on U.S.
companies to innovate and to raise their effi-
ciency.
8 And new information technologies may
havepromotedthedevelopmentofnewfinancial
markets and instruments, which may permit
more efficient sharing of risks and reduce the
costs of financing new business enterprises.
One important explanation for faster produc-
tivitygrowth,however,doesnotnecessarilysug-
gest an increase in trend productivity growth.
The high level of business investment in recent
years has resulted in capital deepening, an
increaseintheamountofcapitalusedbythetyp-
icalworker.Capitaldeepeningmaypartlyreflect
the new investment opportunities created by
rapidtechnologicalchangeandthusmaybecon-
sistent with an increase in trend productivity
growth. But the high level of business invest-
ment may also be due, in large part, to unusually
strong growth of consumer spending and favor-
able corporate profits, which may not be sus-
tainable over the long run. Because these
explanations are not mutually exclusive, the
high level of productivity-enhancing business
investment may reflect a combination of tem-
porary and longer-lasting factors.
9
Will faster productivity growth continue?
As the previous section suggests, economic
analysts disagree about the outlook for pro-
ductivity growth partly because of differing
viewsabouttherelativeimportanceofthetrend
and cyclical explanations. Some researchers
have found little evidence of a broad technol-
ogy- based acceleration in productivity. Robert
Gordon, for example, found that faster pro-
ductivity growth could be explained by a com-
bination of measurement changes, cyclical pro-
ductivity effects, and rapid productivity gains in
one relatively small economic sectorproduc-
tion of computers and related equipment. Other
observers, however, believe that the recent pro-
ductivity acceleration is due to more widespread
effects from new information technologies, and
that the U.S. economy is still in the early stages
of a new industrial revolution.
Because economists disagree about the
importance of different factors contributing to
recentproductivitygrowth,itistemptingtorely
onpurelystatisticalmodelsthatdonotrequirea
deeper understanding of the sources of produc-
tivity growth. However, because faster produc-
tivity growth is a recent development, such
statistical models do not have enough observa-
tionstoconcludewithahighdegreeofcertainty
that trend productivity growth has increased
(Filardo). Additional years of faster productiv-
ity growth are needed before such models can
determine whether there has been a shift in the
productivity trend.
Although it is hard to tell whether faster pro-
ductivity growth represents an upward shift in
the trend or an unsustainable cyclical develop-
14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYment, many reputable economists are gradually
raising their estimates of potential output
growth. For example, Gordon, who found little
evidence of a widespread new-economy effect
from information technology, has still raised his
estimate of potential output growth. The Con-
gressional Budget Office and the Council of
Economic Advisers have also increased their
projections for potential output growth to reflect
capitaldeepeningandafasterpaceoftechnolog-
ical change. Moreover, many private-sector
forecasters have raised their estimates of poten-
tial economic growth.
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Economists have not, however, had a good
track record at predicting productivity growth in
the past. For example, the slowdown of produc-
tivity growth in the early 1970s was not widely
anticipated by forecasters, and economists still
do not have a good understanding of why pro-
ductivity growth slowed at that time.
Policymakers must, therefore, view such fore-
casts as being subject to considerable uncer-
tainty.
III. THE INFLATION OUTLOOK
Although productivity growth may be the most
intriguing factor in the inflation outlook, policy-
makers must weigh other important issues, such
as the uncertain effects of higher oil prices and
tight labor markets on future inflation. This sec-
tion first examines survey and market-based
evidence on inflation expectations. Then, it argues
that, despite seemingly benign inflation expecta-
tions,monetarypolicymakersmustremainvigilant
against potential inflationary imbalances.
Evidence on inflation expectations
Recent survey evidence shows that most fore-
casters expect inflation to remain near last years
moderate level. Looking first at short-term
expectations, respondents to the Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters at the end of 1999 pre-
dicted a 2.5 percent CPI inflation rate in 2000,
about the same as the 2.6 percent rate actually
experienced last year (Table 2). The GDP price
index was expected to rise 1.7 percent this year,
slightly above the 1.6 percent rate in 1999. Par-
ticipants in the Blue Chip and Livingston sur-
veys made similar forecasts for CPI and GDP
price index inflation in 2000.
11 However, con-
sumersparticipatingintheUniversityofMichi-
gans survey anticipated a 3.0 percent increase
in consumer prices in 2000, 0.5 percentage
point above last years rate.
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Long-term inflation expectations also were
stable, remaining near last years moderate
inflation rate (Table 3). According to the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters, the average
CPI inflation rate over the next ten years is pre-
dicted to be 2.5 percent, exactly the same as the
forecast made at the end of 1998.
13 The
Livingston Survey reported an identical infla-
tion expectation for the next ten years. How-
ever, the University of Michigans Consumer
Surveyfoundasomewhathigherexpectationof
2.9 percent CPI inflation over the next five to
ten years. But this forecast also matched the
response given at the end of 1998, suggesting
noupwardmovementinthelong-terminflation
expectations of consumers.
Market-based indicators provide greater evi-
dence that inflation expectations may have
risen last year. The yield on 10-year Treasury
Inflation Protection Securities (TIPS) gives a
market-based estimate of the real interest rate.
The10-yearTIPSyieldrosealittlelessthan0.5
percentage point from the fourth quarter of
1998 to the fourth quarter of 1999, while the
yield on a conventional 10-year Treasury note
increasedalmost1.5percentagepoints.Theris-
ing differential between these rates could be
due partly to higher 10-year inflation expecta-
tions by investors. Yields on TIPS are difficult
to interpret, however, because of the limited
liquidityinthesemarkets(Shen)andthegreater
desire of investors for liquidity after recent
world financial crises. But ignoring these cave-
ECONOMIC REVIEW l FIRST QUARTER 2000 15ats, 10-year inflation expectations were around 2
percent annually based on Treasury rates in the
fourth quarter of last year. Thus, though the
increase in market-based expectations is wor-
risome, implied 10-year inflation expectations
remained moderate.
Implications for monetary policy
Although seemingly benign, such inflation
expectations do not imply that monetary
policymakers can relax their vigilant stance
against inflation. Surveys of expectations do not
fully convey the reasons behind a consensus
forecast of moderate inflation. Some of the busi-
ness forecasters and households responding to
such surveys may be optimistic about productiv-
ity growth, believing an upward shift in trend
productivity growth will mitigate future infla-
tionary pressures. But other respondents may
simply be assuming the Federal Reserve will
take whatever policy actions are necessary to
keep the inflation rate near recent levels. Some
ofthesurveyresponsesmadeattheendof1999
may, therefore, have assumed a tightening of
monetary policy.
Even if trend productivity growth has
increased, monetary policy may need to be
adjusted at times to keep overall supply and
demand in balance. Federal Reserve Governor
Meyer noted that higher trend productivity
growth has profound effects on demand as
well as supply. Technological advances, such
as computerization and the Internet, create new
profit opportunities, spurring higher business
investment spending. In addition, these same
profit opportunities may encourage higher
stock prices, which can raise household wealth
and thereby encourage stronger growth of con-
sumer spending.
14 Finally, to the extent that
faster productivity growth is expected to per-
sist, households will anticipate higher future
incomes, also causing higher consumer spend-
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Table 2
INFLATION FORECASTS FOR 2000
Percent
Forecast Date published CPI GDP price index
Survey of Professional Forecasters 4th Quarter 1999 2.5 1.7
Blue Chip consensus December 1999 2.4 1.7
Livingston Survey December 1999 2.5 NA
University of Michigan
Consumer Survey December 1999 3.0 NA
Notes: Data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and Blue Chip consensus are the medians and averages, respec-
tively, of individual forecasts of Q4/Q4 percent changes. The Livingston Survey figure is the average of individual fore-
casts of December/December percent changes. The figure for the University of Michigan Consumer Survey is the median
of individual expectations for inflation in the next 12 months. GDP price index forecasts are not available from the
LivingstonSurveyortheMichiganSurvey.TheFederalReserveBankofPhiladelphiacompilestheSurveyofProfessional
Forecasters and the Livingston Survey.ing. As Governor Meyer stated, we cannot
assume the higher trend productivity eliminates
concern about overheating.
Moreover, economic growth has outstripped
most of the recent upwardly revised estimates of
potential output growth. Real GDP grew at well
overa5percentannualpaceinthesecondhalfof
1999, far above most recent estimates of poten-
tial growth. Even if trend productivity growth
has increased, the economy might already be
operating ator beyondits productive poten-
tial, setting in motion pressures that could raise
inflationovertheyearsahead.Suchconcernsare
reinforced by the tightness of domestic labor
markets and the growing trade deficit, both fac-
tors that suggest demand may have been exceed-
ingthesustainablesupplyofdomesticoutput.
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Federal Reserve policymakers have recog-
nized a continued need for vigilance in light of
the current strength in domestic spending. In its
statement announcing an increase in the federal
funds rate target on February 2 of this year, the
Federal Open Market Committee stated that it
remains concerned that over time increases in
demand will continue to exceed the growth of
potential supply, even after taking account of
the pronounced rise in productivity growth.
Policymakers must remain vigilant because
faster productivity growth, by itself, cannot
guarantee price stability and sustainable eco-
nomic growth.
IV.CONCLUSION
Rapid real GDP growth and moderate infla-
tion combined to make 1999 an exceptional
year. The increase in consumer price inflation
was chiefly due to higher oil prices, while there
was little or no acceleration in core price mea-
sures. Faster productivity growth helped main-
tain last years moderate core consumer price
inflation. And as the evidence continues to
accumulate, more and more economists are
boosting their estimates of trend productivity
growth.Althoughthereasonsforfasterproduc-
tivity growth are not entirely clear, technologi-
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Notes: Data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and University of Michigan Consumer Survey are the medians of
the individual forecasts. Figures from the Livingston Survey are the averages of the individual forecasts. The Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia compiles the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Livingston Survey.cal advances such as computers and the Internet
are likely making a contribution. But growth of
domestic spending has recently exceeded even
the upwardly revised estimates of potential out-
put growth, a situation that could eventually lead
torisingcoreinflation.Asaresult,policymakers
must remain vigilant against inflationary
imbalances because that is the best way that
monetary policy can promote long-run eco-
nomic growth.
ENDNOTES
1 The CPI and the PCE price index are both widely used to
measure consumer price inflation.
2 Empirical evidence is mixed concerning the effect of
higher oil prices on core CPI inflation. For example, Lown
and Rich present a model in which higher oil prices can raise
core CPI inflation. However, Hooker finds that oil price
changes have had little or no effect on core inflation since
1980, although oil price shocks contributed substantially to
core inflation before 1980.
3Economictheorysuggeststhatsuchfactorsshouldraisethe
price of tobacco relative to other goods and services with no
long-run effect on the general price level. However, to the
extent that offsetting price adjustments for other goods and
services take a long time to occur, the sharp rise in tobacco
prices might temporarily raise CPI inflation and other broad
inflation measures.
4 The ECI differs from compensation per hour in several
ways. For example, compensation per hour includes some
forms of compensation that are not in the ECI, such as pro-
prietors income. In addition, the ECI employs fixed indus-
try-occupation weights, but compensation per hour does not
(Garner). Both compensation per hour and the ECI are
broadermeasuresoflaborcompensationthanaveragehourly
earnings, which covers nonsupervisory and production
workers.
5 Several analysts have compared recent faster productivity
growth with the golden era of the mid-1960s. However,
McClellan noted some important differences between these
periods. The expansion of the capital stock was more wide-
spread across industrial sectors in the 1960s. In addition, the
recent surge in productivity growth has been concentrated in
the computer sector, and unlike the 1960s, productivity
growth in the nondurable goods sector has deteriorated.
6 A better measure of technological change is multifactor
productivity, which measures the average output produced
by a fixed bundle of capital and labor (Bauer). Data on
multifactor productivity are available with a relatively long
time lag. However, over 1990-97, multifactor productivity
grew only 0.4 percentage point annually, up from an aver-
age annual gain of zero in 1979-90. Such productivity
growth was far short of average experience in the 1950s
and 1960s. However, multifactor productivity growth
increased more sharply in 1990-97 for the manufacturing
sector.
7The correlation between growth in nonfarm business out-
putandgrowthinnonfarmbusinessproductivityover1960
to 1999 is 0.6.
8 International trade has grown faster than gross national
product(GNP)overmostoftheperiodsinceWorldWarII.
But international trade has especially increased in the
1990s, with the ratio of trade (defined as exports plus
imports)toGNPrisingtoover25percentrecently(Council
of Economic Advisers). Throughout the postwar era, tech-
nological advances have helped lower the costs of air-
freight and transcontinental telephone calls. More recently,
the Internet and e-mail have probably lowered the costs of
trading over long distances. New information technologies
mayhavebeenparticularlyimportantinpromotinginterna-
tional trade in services. Changes in government policies
concerning international trade and capital flows may also
have encouraged the trend toward globalization.
9 Another explanation for faster productivity growth may
be improvements in the quality of the U.S. labor force.
Some analysts argue that the work force is becoming better
educated, and that the mix of skills is shifting toward
greater specialization in technical and scientific fields that
breed technological innovation (PaineWebber). In addi-
tion, the aging of the baby-boom generation might be
enhancing labor productivity through reduced job turnover
and increased acquisition of skill on the job.
10Themedianestimateofpotentialoutputgrowthfromthe
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphias Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters has risen 0.6 percentage point in the last
year. In the first quarter of 1999, survey respondents
reported a potential growth rate for the next ten years of 2.5
percent annually, but this estimate had risen to nearly 2.9
percentannuallyinthethirdquarter.Inresponsetotherevi-
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sional forecasters raised their median estimate another 0.2
percentage point, to 3.1 percent annually. This increase
matches the 0.2-percentage-point increase in average annual
growth for 1959-98 in the revised accounts.
11 The outlook for core consumer price inflation might be
less benign than these projections of overall inflation sug-
gest. Many forecasters probably anticipated reduced infla-
tionary pressures from energy prices but also may have
expected higher core inflation in 2000. The surveys are not
clearonthisissue,however,becausetheydonotaskforcore
inflation forecasts.
12 In the Federal Reserves semiannual Monetary Policy
Report to Congress, Federal Reserve governors and Reserve
Bank presidents presented their projections for PCE price
indexinflationin2000.Thecentraltendencyoftheseprojec-
tions was 1 ¾ percent to 2 percent, compared with the actual
PCE inflation rate of 2.0 percent in 1999. Prior to the latest
report, Federal Reserve governors and Reserve Bank presi-
dents submitted projections for CPI inflation. The expected
decline in PCE price index inflation was due, at least partly,
to likely moderation in energy prices compared with last
years large increases. Elsewhere in the economy, prices
could be pushed upward by such factors as firmer nonoil
import prices, the pass-through effects of last years rise in
oil prices, and pressures from tight labor markets.
13 Ten-year inflation expectations in the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters actually decreased slightly from 2.5 per-
cent in the fourth quarter of 1998 to 2.3 percent in the first
quarter of 1999. However, the long-term expectation went
back to 2.5 percent in the second quarter of 1999, and
stayed at that level for the remainder of the year.
14 Empirical estimates suggest that consumer spending
risesby3to4centsforeveryadditionaldollarofstockmar-
ket wealth. Capital gains in excess of income increases are
estimatedtohaveraisedgrossdomesticpurchasesbyabout
one percentage point annually over the past five years
(Greenspan 2000b).
15 In contrast, industrial capacity utilization does not sug-
gest such strong pressures on productive resources. The
capacity utilization rate in manufacturing was 80.2 percent
in December 1999, slightly below the average utilization
rate over the last 30 years. One factor that has held down
capacityutilizationislargegainsinmanufacturingcapacity
caused by strong business investment. Another factor has
been rapid import growth, which has helped meet domestic
demand without utilizing U.S. plant and equipment.
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